本文轉自【中國日報】；
美國為什麼把中國的崛起視作“威脅”，想盡辦法極力阻撓？在中國日報社新時代大講堂上，英國劍橋大學前高級研究員、中國問題專家馬丁·雅克認為，這是一種帝國主義大國的心理在作祟。長久以來，美國擁有壓倒性的全球霸權，“美國天下第一”的想法深刻於一些美國人骨子裏。因此，面對中國的崛起，美國的反應就是從各個方面極力阻撓和打壓。但是，馬丁·雅克犀利指出，歷史證明，沒有哪個國家可以一直做老大。
文末有27分鐘完整演講視頻，不要錯過馬丁·雅克
英國劍橋大學政治與國際關係學院前高級研究員
“新時代大講堂”
英文演講
《中國崛起是世界和平及發展的有力保障，而不是威脅》
（略有刪節，中文為譯文）
中美早期關係為什麼還不錯？因為美國認為中國會西化
中國從1978年開始的崛起是在一個相對穩定的國際環境中進行的，而這種發展有一個關鍵因素，就是中美之間相對良性的關係。
China's rise from 1978 took place in a relatively stable international environment. And at the core of this was the relatively benign relationship between the United States and China.
在這一時期，美國對中國的態度是基於兩個基本假設。
There were two fundamental assumptions that underpinned America's attitude towards China over this period.
第一個假設是中國在經濟上落後太多，幾乎沒有可能會挑戰或威脅到美國在世界範圍內的經濟優勢地位。
The first was that China was so far behind economically, that it was virtually impossible to imagine China becoming an economic challenger or threat to American economic ascendancy in the world.
第二個因素，也是我認為更重要的因素是，美國認為中國在現代化過程中會西化。
And the second factor and I think a more important factor was that the American belief was that as China modernized, it would westernize.
因為美國的態度基本上是，現代化的過程等同於西化的過程。所以美國的假設是中國會漸漸變得像一個西方國家，看起來像美國一樣，比如採用西式的政治體制。
Because remember the American attitude fundamentally was that the process of modernization was also a process of westernization. So the American assumption was that over time, China would become increasingly look like a western country, look like the United States have, for example, centrally, a western style political system.
美國想當然地認為，如果中國沒有這樣發展，那麼它的崛起就會走到盡頭、碰壁，無法持續。
And the Americans took it for granted that if this didn't happen, then China's rise would come to an end, hit a wall, be unsustainable.
轉折發生在2008年金融危機
2008年的西方金融危機打破了美國對中國的這兩個假想。轉折就從這裏開始。這完全出乎意料。
Now, what began to undermine these two American assumptions about China really starts with the financial crisis, Western financial crisis in 2008. This was the beginning of the turning point. Now, this was completely unexpected.
自1931年以來，美國還沒有經歷過這樣的金融危機。在這個時期，美國遇到了大麻煩，西方遇到了大麻煩。
America had not experienced a financial crisis like this since 1931. And America was in big trouble – the West was in big trouble during this period.
説實話，西方一直沒有真正從這次危機中恢復過來，經濟增長一直疲軟，疫情開始之後又是另一番樣子。從某種程度來説，西方經濟艱難地維持着。
And to be frank, it's never really recovered. Its growth rates are still, until the pandemic which is a different story. To some extent, the Western economy has been on a life support system.
與此同時，中國在這期間的情況完全不同。
Meanwhile, China has been in a completely different situation during this period.
中國當然受到了這次危機的影響，但基本上中國繼續以和之前差不多的速度增長。
I mean, China was of course affected by it, but basically China continues to grow at more or less the same rate, as it had before.
到了2014年，根據世界銀行的衡量標準，按購買力平價方法計算，中國的國內生產總值趕超美國。這一時期，按年計算，中國在全球經濟增長總額當中佔三分之一。可以看到，雙方的發展出現差異。
And by 2014, extraordinarily, China overtook the United States in terms of GDP, primary purchasing power, according to this measure from the World Bank. China by this time also, on an annual basis, was accounting for one third of global economic growth. So you see, there's a chasm in experience.
還有一些其他方面的問題不能不提，那就是政治。
But there was something else we must add to this picture. And that was,remember, politics.
西方本以為金融危機會在中國發生，但它卻在西方發生了。西方本以為政治危機會在中國發生，但它也在西方發生了。
The economic crisis was expected by the West to happen in China - ithappened in the West. The political crisis was expected by the West to happen in China - it happened in the West.
不滿的聲音越來越多，特別是美國和其他地方的傳統勞動階層羣體。隨之而來的是民粹主義的興起。這是一個非常重要的時刻，對西方的經濟和政治形勢產生極大影響。
And you got the rise of growing dissatisfaction, particularly amongst traditional working class people and so on in the States and elsewhere. And the rise of what we came to know, as populism. So this was a really important moment, which began to undermine the situation in the West, both economically and politically.
結果是，西方政府，但不僅僅侷限於政府圈，對來自中國的“挑戰”，越來越感到焦慮。這個自1972年以來的合作伙伴漸漸被視為一種威脅。
And with the consequence that there was also a growing anxiety in the West, and particularly in governing circles, but not only in governing circles, about the challenge of China, the partner as it were since 1972, was seen increasingly as a threat.
焦慮與日俱增，結果就是對中國的敵意越來越大。最終，對中國的敵意在2016年特朗普當選美國總統後達到了高潮。
There was growing anxiety; there was growing hostility towards China as a result of this. And eventually, of course, this culminates in the election of Trump in 2016, as American president.
美國人為什麼不能容忍中國崛起
美國為什麼不能容忍中國崛起？為什麼它把中國崛起直接解讀為中國威脅？
Now, why couldn't America tolerate the rise of China? Why does it immediately translate China's rise into the China threat?
要解答這個問題，我們必須要了解一個帝國主義大國的心理，尤其是美國。
And here, we have to, I think, understand the psychology of an imperial power, and the United States in particular.
美國在一個相當長的歷史時期，幾個世紀以來，一直保持着一種上升的勢頭。從1945年開始，他們一直擁有壓倒性的全球霸權。
You see, the Americans are extraordinarily over a very long historical period, centuries, have always been on the rise. And since 1945, they've been overwhelmingly global hegemonic.
美國天下第一，這是刻在一些美國人骨子裏的一種想法。不僅僅是總統和國會議員這麼想，許多普通美國人也對此深信不疑。
The idea that America is number one is part of the American DNA. It's not just the presidents and the congressmen and so on who believe this. This is deeply imbued, I think, in the average Americans.
他們認為自己是最好的，他們必須是頭兒。他們不能被別人指揮，他們不會被別人比下去。
The Americans think they are best; the Americans think they have to be top dogs. They're not going to be bossed around by anyone else. They're not going to be rivaled by anyone else.
當然，現實可不是這樣。從歷史上看，沒有任何一個國家可以永保第一。想想中國——百年的屈辱，曾經的地位被取而代之。英國也是如此。美國也將會是這樣。
Now, of course, the reality is rather different, historically speaking, because no country can ever expect to be number one forever. Think of China, the century of humiliation – China was displaced. And so this was the case with Britain, and so on. And this will be the case with the United States.
美國經濟的相對下滑大概是從80年代左右開始的。但美國一直不承認，時至今日也不承認。一個美國總統如果説：“我們正在衰退而且無法逆轉，我們必須調整自己去適應一個全新的世界。”這無異於自殺。美國還沒有做好接受這種論調的準備。
America's relative economic decline probably starts around the 1980s. But the Americans have basically been in denial of this. Even to this day, they're largely in denial. It would be suicide for an American president to say: "We are in decline, and we cannot change that situation. We have to accommodate ourselves to a new world." Americans are not ready for this kind of argument.
那麼美國對中國這個威脅作何反應？從本質上講，美國的反應是攻擊中國，想辦法增加中國崛起的難度。如果有可能的話，阻止中國的崛起。如果不行，至少阻撓中國的崛起。所以特朗普當上總統後沒過多久貿易戰就開始了。
So what was the American response to China as a threat? Essentially, the American response was an assault against China, to find a way of making China's rise more difficult. To prevent China's rise, if possible. If not, at least obstruct China's rise. And so after Trump becomes president, you see, after a short while, the beginning of the trade war.
在貿易戰之後，或者説在貿易戰 、科技戰的同時，對中國的態度愈發尖鋭粗暴。你能看到他們在各個方面對中國進行攻擊。
And then after the trade war, or alongside the trade war, the tech war and steadily as the acrimonious and abrasive approach to China developed, you see actions to be taken against China on all sorts of different fronts.
美中新“冷戰”與美蘇冷戰有三點不同
我想説的是，也許可以把現在世界所處的形勢，以及美國和中國之間的關係稱為新“冷戰”。
I would argue now, I think probably it would be appropriate to call the situation that the world is now in, and the relationship between the United States and China, as a new "Cold War".
但我們用“冷戰”這個詞，並不代表我們要把現在的情況與美蘇冷戰混為一談。有三個根本區別。
But just because we use the term "Cold War" doesn't mean we should confuse or conflate this "Cold War" with the one between United States and the Soviet Union. There are three fundamental differences between them.
第一個區別是，美國和蘇聯所處的和所擁有的是兩個完全不同的經濟世界。雙方永不產生接觸，他們擁有兩個不同的國際體系。一個是屬於美國的，另一個是屬於蘇聯的。
The first is that the United States and the Soviet Union lived and occupied two entirely different economic worlds. Never the twain shall meet – they just had two different international systems, one belonging to the United States, the other to the Soviet Union.
中國的情況當然不是這樣，中國與全球經濟高度融合。其實在某些方面，中國與全球經濟的融合程度比美國還要高。比如貿易，同為進出口貿易國，中國要比美國重要得多。
Now, of course, this is not the situation with China. China is hugely integrated with the global economy. Indeed, I would argue that in some respects, it's more integrated with the global economy than is true of the United States. I mean, take for one thing, trade. China is a much more important trading nation, exporting and importing, than the United States.
無論美國説什麼，無論特朗普政府想做什麼，他們都無法將中國從全球經濟中剝離出去。他們可能會嘗試這樣做，但在我看來他們不會走到那一步。
Now, whatever the American say, whatever the Trump administration would like to do, they will not be able to exile China from the global economy. They can go about it, but they won't get that far in my view.
他們無法將中國從全球經濟中剔除，中國實在是太重要了，與全球經濟一體化程度太高了，它與眾多國家的關係太密切了，不可能被剔除出去。
They can't take China out of the global economy. It is simply too important; it is too integrated; its relations with so many countries around the world are too advanced for that to happen.
第二點，蘇聯在經濟方面從來都不是美國的對手。頂多只有美國經濟規模的60%左右，可能還不到，只有大約一半。
My second point is the Soviet Union was never an economic pair or equal of the United States. At most it had maybe 60% of the size of the American economy, probably less, probably more like half.
但中國不是這樣的，2014年中國按購買力平價方法計算，經濟規模就已經趕超美國了。
Now, you cannot say that of China. China, already in 2014 as we've seen, had overtaken the size of the American economy, measured by primary purchasing power, GDP.
人們普遍預計在未來幾年內，也許是五年，一部分取決於疫情的影響，以國內生產總值的另一個衡量標準，也就是以美元為單位來計算，中國的經濟規模將超過美國。
Now, it is generally expected that within the next few years, maybe five years, depends partly on the impact of the pandemic, that China will overtake the United States by the other measure of GDP, which is in dollar terms.
如果我們把時間範圍再擴大一點，到2030年前後，全球經濟大概是這樣的：
And if we extend the time horizon a bit further, you'll see the picture of the global economy by roughly 2030.
這些數字只是預測，不是事實。但你能從中感受到，到2030年，中國可以佔到全球生產總值的三分之一。到那時，它的經濟規模將達到美國的兩倍。按照這個標準，中國的經濟規模要比美國大20%。
Now all these figures are obviously projection so they're not facts. But you'll see, it gives you some idea, that by 2030 China could account for one third of global GDP, by which time it will be something like twice the size of the American economy, already by this measure, by the way, it is 20% bigger than the American economy.
所以，中國經濟的崛起十分強大，而且根基很深。它在許多不同的領域都顯示了實力，當然也包括科技。
So, you know, the rise of China economically is formidable. And it is deeply embedded. And it is showing its ability to perform in many different areas, including, of course, technology.
第三點，蘇聯在對美關係中犯了一個根本性的錯誤，那就是軍備競賽。它試圖在軍事上與美國競爭，投入了大量資金，浪費了許多資源，這是一種災難性的做法。
The third point I would make is that the Soviet Union made a fundamental mistake in its relationship with the United States. And that was the arms race. It tried to compete militarily with the United States. And it spent so much money, wasted such resources, a disastrous approach.
中國不會犯這種錯誤。中國不像美國或蘇聯那樣強調軍事。中國更加重視經濟的發展。
China won't make that mistake. China doesn't emphasize the military in a way that, for example, the United States does, or the Soviet Union did. China's approach is the fundamental importance of the economy.
新“冷戰”的結束，取決於美國的轉變
對於“冷戰”和美中之間的對立關係，我們無法預測這種情況會持續多久。但是，可以説這種對立關係改變的條件是美國立場的轉變。
I think the prospect is that we are looking at this kind of situation we've got now – the "Cold War" and an antagonistic relationship between the United States and China for the foreseeable future. It's impossible to predict how long. But you can say or I would argue that the condition for a change in this antagonism depends on a shift in the American position.
美國堅持認為他們是世界上唯一的主導者，但這已經不可能了。只有當美國認同必須與中國一道共同實施全球治理的時候，這種氣氛和關係才會發生變化。我認為，這是中美關係出現新局面的前提條件。
You see, the Americans are insisting that they should enjoy sole primacy in the world. And this is no longer possible. This atmosphere and relationship will change at the moment when the United States comes to the view that it must share primacy in the world with China, and that will be the precondition for, I think, a new term in the relationship between the United States and China.
西方國家在疫情中對待中國的態度極不光彩
西方國家對待中國最不光彩的、最令人沮喪的一幕，發生在本次全球新冠疫情中。
And I think one of the most depressing, in fact, one of the most disgraceful episodes in western attitudes towards China was to do with the pandemic – COVID-19.
一月，中國正在努力弄清楚這次疫情是什麼，確定病毒、研究應對方法。而西方，尤其是美國但不只美國，我自己的國家英國也有參與，無情地攻擊中國，説中國掩蓋秘密、不告訴我們真相、掩蓋存活率、比起人民的生命，政府和政黨更重要等等，諸如此類的。
In January, China was struggling to understand to identify it and to work out how to deal with it. And the West, particularly the Americans, but not only the Americans, my own country Britain for sure, attacked, relentlessly attacked China, you know, cover up your secrecy. You're not telling us the truth. You're covering up the survival. The government matters, the party matters more than the survival of people.
而這時中國正與巨大的困難抗爭。要知道，中國是第一個遭受疫情的國家。而現在，你能看到，中國面對新冠疫情的表現從一月末起就非常優秀。
This is a situation where China was struggling in great, great difficulty. Remember, China was the first to tackle the question of COVID-19. Now and you can see that actually, China's performance on COVID-19, certainly from late January, was brilliant.
這些數字是按人均計算的百萬人均確診人數。你看中國可能是全世界表現最好的國家，雖然它不得不最先面對新冠疫情。
These figures here, are on the basis per capita, the number of cases per million people, look at China, the strongest, probably the strongest performance of any country in the world, even though it had to tackle COVID-19 before anyone else.
而所有那些大批評家，美國和其他西方國家，包括我的國家英國等等。一月時，他們攻擊中國，毫無同情心。他們本應該把握住多出來的兩個月的時間，本可以向中國學習。結果看看他們，表現得慘不忍睹。
And all those great critics, the United States and other Western countries, my own United Kingdom and so on, who could not stop themselves to (from) attacking China showed no compassion in January, had those two extra months to deal with it, could have learned from China. And look at them, a miserable performance.
我想説，本次疫情或許首先是對治理能力的考驗。毫無疑問中國已經從根本上通過了這個考驗，交出了一份出色的答卷，而美國，在特朗普的領導下，很遺憾，證明是不稱職的。
And I would say this, in addition, that the pandemic has been, perhaps, above all, a test of governance. And without question, China has come through this fundamentally, with flying colors. And the United States has been proven under the Trump leadership, but I think, unfortunately, more generally, to have been incompetent.
而如今，中國正走出疫情，創造經濟機遇。
And the fact that China is now coming out of the pandemic, of course, has created major economic opportunities.
這清單上（國際貨幣基金組織預測）只有一個國家，2020年的國內生產總值會出現正增長，就是中國。
There's only one country of this list here, that is going to have positive growth in terms of GDP in 2020. And that is China.
中國的崛起之路不靠戰爭
我還要説一個方面。自從中國1978年開始崛起，中國並沒有真正參與過任何戰爭。這是中國大崛起、大轉型的時期，從一無所有到現在與世界上經濟最強大的國家平起平坐。
Let me just say something else as well here. Since China's rise started in 1978, China has not really been involved in any wars whatsoever. This is the period of China's great rise, great transformation, from nothing to now being equal with the most powerful country in the world economically.
看看美國的歷史，或者德國、英國、日本的歷史。這些國家在崛起時期都參與了很多戰爭。換句話説，中國在這一時期的發展過程中是非常剋制的。
Now look at American history, or German history, or British history, or Japanese history, all of these countries were involved in many wars during the equivalent period of their historical development. China, in other words, has exercised extraordinary restraint during this period of its development.
目前的國際體系無法長期存在
我認為目前的國際體系無法長期存在。我們生活在一個與此前完全不同的世界，一個快速轉變的世界。
I don't believe the present international system can survive for a long time. We live in a completely different world, a rapidly transfer changing world.
1980年，世界的經濟中心在這裏。
In 1980, the center of the global economy was here.
它在隨後的30多年裏慢慢地轉移了。今天，它的位置大約在這裏。在這一時期，全球經濟的中心基本上在西歐和美國。
And then slowly in the subsequent 30 odd years, it shifted. And today, it's somewhere about here. That's the center of the global economy. In those days, the global economy was essentially Western Europe and the United States.
到2050年，它會在這裏，基本上就是在印度中國邊境地區。
By 2050, it'll be here, basically on the India-China border.
當事實上的中心在這裏時，國際體系不可能再是一個被美國和西歐這些特權國家控制的體系。
There's no way you can have an international system which is controlled by privileges, the United States and Western Europe, when actually, the center of the action is over here.
這就需要一個不同的全球經濟秩序。關於這個新的國際體系，我想説，首先，它的核心將是中國，佔全球18%的人口。在目前的國際體系中，美國是核心，它的人口只佔世界人口的4.3%。
You need a different kind of global economy, a different kind of global order for that kind of situation. And I would say this, in relationship to this new international system. First of all, the heart of it will be China – 18% of the world's population. At the heart of the present international system, is the United States – just 4.3% of the world's population.
換句話説，這將比目前的國際體系更具有人類代表性 。
In other words, we're talking about an international system which will be far more representative of humanity than it is now.
換句話説，我們正在從一個專制的代表少數人的全球治理體系轉變成一個更能代表全世界的體系。它現在已經初具雛形，今後將更加如此。
In other words, we're moving from an essentially authoritarian, minoritarian system of global governance to something which is far more representative of the world as it has, as it is already, and as it will be even more so in the future.
西方掌控世界的時代要結束了
中國的崛起，不僅僅是中國 ，還有發展中國家的崛起，給西方帶來了很大的危機，我稱之為西方的生存危機。
The rise of China, not just China, the rise of the developing world as well which China of course, is part, is creating a big crisis in the West. I would call it the existential crisis of the West.
因為200年來，西方一直掌控着世界，把這個世界當成是它的世界。所有主要機構都是它設計的，它一直是這些機構的核心，它的人民管理世界。它的語言，現在是英語，占主導地位。現在管理世界的人，大體上都是白人。
Because for 200 years, the West has run the world, has assumed that the world is its world, has been at the heart of all the major institutions, which it has designed. The assumption that its people will run the world, that its language, now English will dominate, that the people who run the world by and large will be white.
這個時代就要結束了，這個時代已經無法再持續下去。不僅僅是中國的崛起，發展中國家也在崛起。
This era is coming to an end. This era is no longer sustainable. It's not just the rise of China. It's the rise of the developing world as well.
反對歧視偏見的行動正在西方國家發生，這種變化，不只是發生在美國，它是一種全球性的變化，是不同民族、不同膚色 、不同語言、不同文化 、不同文明的崛起。
And you're experiencing in the West now, a backlash against its prejudice. And this change is not just happening in the United States. It's a global change. It's the rise of different peoples, different colors, different languages, different cultures, different civilizations.
我喜歡中文的這個表達，包容的文明。而西方還不知道如何接受這一點。
I like the Chinese expression, inclusive civilization. But the West has got no idea how to embrace that.
最後，我想説的是，我認為中國的崛起是非常積極的。這並不代表中國不犯錯誤，沒有犯過錯，未來不會犯錯。當然會犯錯誤。
And I'll just finish by saying this. Look, I regard China's rise to be extraordinarily positive that doesn't mean that China doesn't make mistakes, hasn't made mistakes, won't make mistakes in the future. Of course it will.
中國還在學習的過程中，它才剛剛開始真正成為一個大國。但中國非常擅長學習。我們有目共睹。
It's on a learning curve. It's only just really beginning to be a great power. But China is a very good learner. We can all see that.