周波：中國在俄烏之間選擇的到底是什麼？

【文/觀察者網專欄作者、中國論壇特約專家 周波】

烏克蘭地區衝突已進行了三週，即便塵埃——希望不是放射性塵埃——還沒有落定，但説“世界已經被重塑”已然是陳詞濫調了。

我們身處兩場冷戰的世界。在戰火紛飛的歐洲，恐慌的歐洲人已經在為另一場冷戰做準備。普京提出的“俄羅斯世界（Russky Mir）”的前景，讓一個“腦死亡”的北約重新復甦。

德國，一個最不願意加強武備的國家，一掃幾十年的猶豫不決，一舉投入了1000億歐元的國防預算。這使得法國總統馬克龍一直在倡導、卻停留在口頭上的“歐洲戰略自主”見到曙光，唯一的問題是，它到底會增強還是會削弱跨大西洋聯盟。

在亞洲，美國前總統特朗普的“大國競爭”開啓了冷戰，拜登的對華“極限競爭”加劇了這一過程。拜登曾希望將俄羅斯政策放在一個“穩定和可預測”的基礎上，從而更專注於美國的首要任務——中國。但歐洲的戰爭使拜登的印太戰略進一步空心化，該戰略目的太多，但手段有限。

如果説小國生存的關鍵是做出正確的選擇，那麼大國的生存藝術就是要取得平衡。此時此刻並非澳大利亞總理莫里森所斷言的“中國做出選擇的時刻（a moment of choice for China）”。  

本文作者周波在南華早報發文

如果中國拋棄俄羅斯，跨入西方陣營，那連權宜之計的好處都不會有。中國將失去一個戰略伙伴，而美國再次掉頭對付中國只是遲早的問題。

這就解釋了為什麼北京表示理解俄羅斯對北約擴張的“合理關切”，同時強調必須尊重所有國家的主權和領土完整。中國也在繼續向烏克蘭提供人道主義援助。

在艱難時刻，中國不需要從其他地方尋找啓示，只需要堅守自己的一些久經考驗的原則，這些原則可能對其他國家也有啓發。

第一，不首先使用核武器。俄羅斯武裝力量的武器和人數都超過了烏克蘭軍隊，而烏克蘭軍隊沒有核武器。因此，人們不禁要問，俄羅斯總統普京需要將其核力量置於高度警戒狀態，是不是一個將局勢“先升後降(escalate to de-escalate)”的策略？

這一策略有可能會刺激潛在的核武器國家，對防核擴散的努力則無疑是一個沉重的打擊。但這也可能成為一個契機，讓中國和美國通過討論不首先使用核武器，來表明其負責任的態度，不首先使用核武器是中國自1964年首枚原子彈爆炸成功以來一直堅持的立場。

拜登的立場是，美國核武庫的“唯一目的”是“阻止核攻擊，在必要時實施核報復”，這與中國的立場相去不遠。2021年12月中旬，近700名科學家和工程師，包括21名諾貝爾獎獲得者，要求拜登將美國的核武庫削減三分之一，並宣佈美國永遠不會在衝突中首先使用核武器。

核戰爭，美俄都不想打（視頻截圖）

其次，不結盟。烏克蘭的戰爭再次引發了西方對中俄可能結盟的最大擔憂，這是杞人憂天。中國和俄羅斯都呼籲多極化，但是原因不同。

沒有哪個國家能像中國這樣從全球化中獲得如此多好處，所以維護國際秩序對中國利益攸關。儘管存在分歧，有時甚至關係緊張，但中國與包括美國在內的西方國家有着深厚的聯繫，雙方都不希望一刀兩斷。

相比之下，俄羅斯對現有的國際秩序感到不滿，認為自己是受害者。普京稱蘇聯的解體是“20世紀最大的地緣政治災難”。  

如果中國打算全球軍事擴張，則必然需要結盟。如果中國完全沒有這個想法，就根本沒有必要結盟。迄今為止，中國人民解放軍在海外的軍事行動都是人道主義性質的。解放軍的安全關切主要在西太平洋，而在那裏，中美軍力正趨於平衡。

在俄烏戰爭之前，直到今天，有一點一清二楚：不管是美國，還是三十個國家組成的北約（其中有三個核武器國家），都不敢與俄羅斯正面對抗。

中國的核力量規模不大，這是中國有意為之。除此之外，中國的軍力應該不遜於俄羅斯。中國人民解放軍是全世界最大的軍隊，其軍費雖然不到GDP的2%，但是俄羅斯的三倍。中國已有兩艘航母，還會建造更多，而俄羅斯僅有一艘航母。

第三，不謀求勢力範圍。俄烏衝突是俄羅斯和北約之間關於勢力範圍的衝突。也許沒有哪個地區比東亞看起來更像中國的勢力範圍，實則不然：朝鮮不會像中國和全世界所希望的那樣放棄核武器；好幾個國家是美國的盟友；在南海，中國與一些聲索國依然存在爭議。

今年2月美國發布的“美國印太戰略”聲稱，“（中國）正在集合經濟、外交、軍事和技術力量，謀求在印太地區的勢力範圍”。

這個説法大錯特錯。“影響力”和“勢力範圍”是兩碼事。當今，中國對世界的影響力，特別是在經濟領域的影響力，已經無所不在。因此，中國不需要在任何地方建立代價高昂且難以維繫的勢力範圍。

俄烏衝突，無論多麼具有破壞性，都不會阻止全球政治和經濟向以中國為中心的亞洲轉移。中國是風暴中的平靜地帶，更應該成為穩定之源。不貿然選擇的好處是避免做出糟糕的選擇。

（翻譯：蔣紹澄；核譯：許馨勻、國佳）

Why China is refusing to choose between Russia and Ukraine

Three weeks into the Ukrainian war, even if the dust – hopefully not radioactive dust – has not settled, it is already a cliché to say the world has been reshaped.

We are stepping into a world with two new cold wars to come. In Europe, where the war is raging on, panicking Europeans are already preparing for another cold war. The prospect of a “Russky Mir” (Russian world) has revived a “brain-dead” Nato.

Germany, a country most reluctant to embark on military build-up, has reversed decades of hesitancy and poured 100 billion euros into its defence budget. This makes “European strategic autonomy”, so far a slogan French President Emmanuel Macron has been championing, look more probable down the road. The only question is whether it will add strength to the transatlantic alliance or weaken it.

In Asia, the cold war that dawned with US president Donald Trump’s “great power competition” was intensified by Biden’s “extreme competition” with China. Biden had hoped to put Russia policy on a “stable and predictable” footing to focus on China, which is the US’ top priority. But the war in Europe further hollows out Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which already has too many purposes without adequate tools.

If the key to small nations’ survival is making the right choice, then the art of living for a major power is to strike a balance. This is not “a moment of choice for China”, as Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison asserted.

Should China ditch Russia and walk into the Western camp, it won’t even reap the benefit of expediency. China will lose a strategic partner, and it is only a matter of how quickly the US will take on China again.

This explains why Beijing has expressed understanding of Russia’s “legitimate concerns” over Nato’s expansion while underlining that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected. It is also continuing to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

In tough times, China doesn’t need to look elsewhere for inspiration. It only needs to stand firm on some of its time-tested principles, which could be also illuminating for others.

First, no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The Russian armed forces outgun and outnumber the Ukrainian forces, which have no nuclear weapons. Therefore, one wonders why Russian President Vladimir Putin needs to put his nuclear forces on high alert if this is not a strategy to“escalate to de-escalate”.

This strategy risks encouraging would-be nuclear weapon states and is definitely a heavy blow to non-proliferation. But it could become an opportune moment too, for China and the US to demonstrate their responsible attitude through discussions on no-first-use of nuclear weapons, a position China has held since it detonated a nuclear device in 1964.

Biden’s position that the “sole purpose” of the American arsenal “should be deterring – and if necessary, retaliating against – a nuclear attack” is not far from that of China. In mid-December 2021, nearly 700 scientists and engineers, including 21 Nobel laureates, asked Biden to cut the US nuclear arsenal by a third, and to declare that the United States would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.

Second, non-alliance. The war in Ukraine again raises the West’s worst fears of the prospect of a China-Russia alliance. Such an alliance is impossible. Both China and Russia call for multipolarity, but for different reasons.

No country has benefited so much from globalization as China, which has a strong stake in safeguarding the international order. Despite differences and even tensions sometimes, China has deep ties with the West, including the US, that neither wish to sever.

In comparison, Russia resents the existing international order and sees itself as a victim. Putin called the break-up of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”.

As long as China doesn’t harbour the desire for global military expansion which requires allies, it doesn’t need an alliance. All the military operations of the People’s Liberation Army overseas are humanitarian in nature. Its primary security concern lies in the Western Pacific, where the military balance between the PLA and the US military is closing.

One thing that was crystal clear before the Russian-Ukraine war, and which remains clear today, is that neither the US nor the 30-member-strong Nato, which includes three nuclear powers, dares to confront Russia head on.

China’s military strength is presumably no less formidable than Russia’s, apart from a nuclear arsenal that China chooses to keep small. The PLA is the largest armed force in the world in terms of active personnel. Its military budget, although less than 2 per cent of gross domestic product, is three times bigger than Russia’s. It has two aircraft carriers, with more in the pipeline, while Russia has just one.

Third, no pursuit of spheres of influence. The war in Ukraine is a clash between Russia and Nato over spheres of influence. Perhaps no region looks more like China’s sphere of influence than East Asia, but it isn’t. North Korea won’t give up its nuclear weapons as China and the whole world wishes, quite a few countries are American allies, and in the South China Sea, China has disputes with a few claimants.

The “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” released in February claims that “[China] is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific”.

This cannot be more wrong. “Influence” and “sphere of influence” are two different things. Today, China’s influence, especially in the economic field, is already felt worldwide. Therefore, it doesn’t need to establish spheres of influence anywhere that are costly and difficult to maintain.

The war in Ukraine, however disruptive, won’t stop the global political and economic shifts towards Asia with China at the centre. China is now the eye in the storm. Therefore, it should be the stabiliser. The benefit of making no choice is avoiding a bad choice.

【Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert】

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