來源：財經自媒體
海外之聲 | 全球經濟危機的應對之策與未來挑戰
來源：IMI財經觀察
努特·韋林克
導讀
在70年代石油危機、2008年金融危機以及2020年疫情危機之下，“自力更生”對各國來説成為了一種自然而然卻並不理想的反應。缺乏信任使多邊主義發展受到制約，似乎只有重建信任才能創造美好的未來，而找到共同目標和共同利益則是重建信任的關鍵。
一夜間爆發的新冠病毒疫情對經濟的衝擊是巨大的。傳統觀點認為，在抗擊疫情方面最成功的國家，也表現出最快的經濟復甦，例如中國就給出了很好的示範。疫情期間全球採取的財政刺激措施史無前例，後期如何消解這一刺激是巨大的挑戰。破產和失業對經濟疲軟的反應存在滯後，因此在恢復過程中終止救濟措施的過程十分微妙，結構改革和有針對性的支持必不可少。
“永遠不要浪費一次可能帶來好處的危機。”中國是唯一在2020年實現了正增長的主要經濟體。歐洲也逐漸意識到合作才能解決許多問題，歐盟設立的復甦基金（RRF）與中國有許多共同政策目標。美國也有類似政策，拜登就任後，美國政府也制定了系列重建計劃，旨在從根本上提升美國經濟社會的各方各面。美國的優先事項也與中國和歐盟處於同一方向，都是在應對危機，使經濟適應未來發展並且更具有包容性。
現代貨幣理論（MMT）認為：在實現充分就業前，不必擔心支付公共支出、更高的税款或增加借貸，只需要印發貨幣，通貨膨脹是遠期問題；預算赤字和公共債務不會成為問題，因為預計利率將長期保持在非常低的水平。但事實上不可掉以輕心，貨幣數量也仍然很重要，同時不能忽視各國相互依存的國際背景。用MMT解釋目前可能面對的問題可能並不完全奏效。
目前，央行和政府迫切需要大膽決策和國際協調。世界經濟處於復甦邊緣，但我們面臨的挑戰是巨大的。
作者 | 努特·韋林克，IMI國際委員、荷蘭央行原行長
英文原文如下：
Today’s Solutions, Tomorrow’s Problems?
Nout Wellink, Member of IMI International Committee, Former Governor of the Dutch Central Bank
Time: 3 April 2021
Introduction
The external situation is complex, geopolitically and economically. Self-reliance has become a buzz-word, in China and also in other parts of the world, potentially implying a farewell to the kind of multilateralism that we have seen developing, step by step and to the benefit of all, since World War II. The call for more self-reliance is a natural one after a crisis. But a natural response is not by definition the most desirable. Issues like energy-security, financial security, health security I’ve seen emerging after the oilcrises in the seventies of the last century, after the financial crisis in 2008, and during the coronacrisis in 2020/2021. To some extent, rational and understandable considerations play a role. For example: are international supply chains not becoming too long or too vulnerable? But the root cause of the growing call for much more self-reliance seems lack of trust. Rebuilding trust is at the heart of a better future for all. Part of the process of regaining trust is finding common goals and common interests.
A BRIEF PICTURE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION
The blow of the coronavirus to our economies came overnight and was extraordinary large. Real world gdp collapsed in the first two quarters of 2020. According to quarterly IMF-figures global output declined three times as much as in the financial crisis, in half the time. But the recovery in the 3rd quarter was exceptionally strong. Thereafter the recovery path in the Western world slowed considerably under the influence of a new virus wave.
The economic collapse, but also the recovery, differed from country to country. Conventional wisdom holds that countries that were most successful in fighting the pandemic also showed the fastest economic recovery. The logic behind this is compelling and China offers a remarkable, first-class proof. It already recovered in Q2 of 2020 and since then the Chinese economy remained on track. Table 1 shows the strength of the recovery in the third quarter and the impact on the economy of the second virus wave in the last months of 2020. Misled by the positive economic results over the summer and the apparant succes in the combat against the virus, a number of countries loosened the reins prematurely. The steep recovery in the 3rd quarter benefitted from extraordinary monetary and budgetary stimuli. The 2nd (and 3rd) virus wave, starting at the end of the summer, forced central banks and governments to continue their policies into 2021. For the 2nd half of 2021 and for 2022 a strong upswing is foreseen, especially in China and the US, but also in a number of other countries, assuming that the vaccination process is going well and no new black swans will fly in.
The global fiscal stimulus was unprecedented in economic history and amounted, according to the IMF, to around $ 15 trillion. Fasing out this stimulus, without causing accidents, is an enormous challenge. The exit is often more difficult to find than the entrance. Admittedly, defaults and insolvencies are until now relatively low, but this can change. History shows that bankruptcies and unemployment are slow to respond to a weakening of the economy, and it is highly likely that during the corona crisis the lags will even be longer than in the past since companies and employment are artificially kept afloat by the authorities. Therefore, ending the relief measures as the recovery proceeds is a very delicate process during which structural reforms and targeted support will remain indispensable. It’s a delicate process not only from an economic point of view but also politically.
In Europe, especially the economies of the UK, France, Italy and Spain have been hit hard by the virus. Overwhelmed by the speed of the spreadand initially not taking the danger of the virus seriously enough, these countries - but also for instance the US - reacted at first too slowly and not forcefully enough. This came at a high cost in terms of loss of life. Table 2 shows how high a price (till end March 2021) was actually paid by countries that underperformed in the combat against the COVID-19 virus.
Apart from China (and a few other countries) it is difficult to discover a straigthforward relation between the succes in fighting the virus and economic developments. An important reason is the varying intensity and effectiveness of the combat against the virus. Some countries made up for previous mistakes, others relaxed too early after the first successes. But also the budgetary programs played a role. Content and size of these programs differed, sometimes considerably, from country to country. Take as an example the US. Gdp growth in that country will highly likely in the coming years outperform those of many other countries, in spite of the serious mistakes made in the the control of COVID-19. The buoyant growth perspectives for the US are not surprising against the background of the size of the fiscal stimulus, that resulted in federal budget deficits between 12% and 15% of gdp in 2020 and 2021. These deficits are much higher than those in the aftermath of the financial crisis when they amounted to 8% to 10% of gdp.
During the twentieth century, only in the years 1943-1945 did (much) larger budget deficits in the US occur (20% to 27% of gdp). The complications that arose from these high war deficits, including for monetary policy, are well documented in Herbert Stein’s classic “The Fiscal Revolution in America” and illustrate how difficult it will be to find the right balance in the coming years between fical and monetary policy, not only in the US but also in other countries with large budget deficit and government debt ratio’s. After World War II, the Fed had to fight for years in a row to regain monetary independence.
NEVER WASTE A GOOD CRISIS
China
As the only major economy China succeeded in realizing a positive growth rate (2,3%) in 2020. This was the result of a very successfull fight against the coronavirus, substantial tax reductions and extra lending by banks with a focus on sme’s, poverty alleviation and agricultural firms. Iniatially the main drivers of the upswing were exports (medical supplies, electronic products) and public spending. As the recovery continued and became more solid, the role of the services industries and consumption started to increase.
Not setting a specific growth target for 2021(just promising to keep it “within a reasonable range”), in spite of gdp forecasts of 8% of international organizations, seems sensible to me. Such an approach reduces the risk of overburdening economic policy and creates the flexibility to focus more on high-quality than on quantity. This quality aspect was already given more attention several years ago, but can be found back in reinforced form in the 14th Five-Year Plan, decided at this year’s annual “Two Sessions”. China’s modernization plan encompasses a further structural strengthening of its economy as well as social progress and covers,among other, environmental measures, eduction, healthcare, rural revitalization, food self-sufficiency, the reduction of income inequality,upgrading technology and its use in the Chinese economy. More attention is given to the domestic economy (the “dual circulation strategy”), thereby reducing China’s economic vulnerability for adverse global developments and at the same time addressing domestic needs. This strategy goes hand in hand with a greater trade focus on the own region.
“Never waste a good crisis” is a famous saying of the well-known English statesman Winston Churchill. An unbiased look at the Five-Year Plan leads to the conclusion that the challenges posed by the international economy and geopolitical developments are being addressed in a targeted manner, while at the same time the authorities are looking ahead and trying to cope with existing and future problems. However difficult this may be, I sincerely hope that multilateralism will remain a cornerstone of Chinese policy and of the policies of the other economic superpowers.
Europe
Europe is also trying, in its own way, to give substance to the saying that you should never waste a good crisis. The realization is growing that a number of problems can only be solved jointly and that some of these problems should also be given a much higher priority, amongst them for example the climate but also the necessity to create more inclusive societies. The EU suspended already in late March 2020 its budget rule book, creating fiscal space by lifting budget deficit and government debt restrictions. Heads of State and Governments of the European Union subsequently endorsed, after complicated discussions, the proposal of the European Commission to create a 750 billion euro (6% of gdp) Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This proposal combines increased solidarity within the EU, to fight together the pandemic, with the need to make EU’s economies more sustainable and resilient. Access to the Fund (for grants and/or loans) can only be gained through investments and reforms that reflect priorities that, interestingly enough, also underpin the Chinese policy direction: green transition, digital transformation, inclusive growth and jobs, health, policies for the next generation (including education and skills). Directionally the EU has many policy goals and priorities in common with China.
United States
I also see policy similarities with regard to the United States. Immediately after taking office Biden promised to remain committed to the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Accord. Subsequently, he received congressional approval for a $1.9 trillion program (11-12% of US gdp), aimed at alleviating the economic toll of the coronacrisis.This package is about twice the size of Europe’s RRF and has brought the French president Macron immediately to the conclusion that Europe should think bigger. At the moment support for additional European programs seems less likely.
The US administration is now working on an additional, multi-year $ 3 to 4 trillion program, called the “Build Back Better” (BBB)-plan. This plan consists of two parts. The first part (“The Job Plan”), announced by President Biden on 31 March 2020, focusses on improving infrastructure while addressing at the same time environmental worries. The second part (“The Family Plan”) aims at creating a more inclusive society and deals with issues like healthcare, education and social security. It remains to be seen to what extent this new program can pass the Congress, because - unlike the 1.9 trillion package - a substantial part of it should be offset by (corporate) tax increases. Biden’s policy intention is to fundamentally upgrade all aspects of the American economy and society. This upgrading process requires quite a lot from Research and Development (R&D) andhigh-tech industries and, therefore, this will be one of the spearheads of the US-policy.
The US priorities sound familiar, are fine-tuned to the specifics of the American situation, but directionally not that different from the policy priorities of China and the EU. They all find their basis in the need to cope with the coronacrisis and to make the economies future-proof and more inclusive. But that is, unfortunately, not the whole story. The policy priorities are also partly fed by highly competitive considerations, political and economic, and the idea of “home country first”, which threatens to push the need for multilateral cooperation into the background. There is the realization that more cooperation is needed in important areas (climate, health) but when it comes to content, scale and timing of today’s unprecedented challenges, hardly any attention is paid to international coordination and possible negative externalities. A positive in this regard is China’s repeated assurance that it will continue opening up and participating more fully in international cooperation. That’s in the interest of China itself, but also important for the rest of the world.
TODAY’S SOLUTIONS, TOMORROW’S PROBLEMS?
Government are floating many ideas and implementing many programs to cope with today’s and tomorrow’s problems, and they should. But admirable as this is, sometimes I get the impression, listening to politicians and economists, that they are in danger of forgetting the existence of budgetary and monetary constraints. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) offers to some extent the intellectual underpinning of their thinking. According to the proponents of this theory it is not necessary to worry about paying for public expenditure with higher taxes or increased borrowing until full employment is achieved. Just print the money. The idea of MMT is that sovereign countries are not constrained in their spending when they operate in a fiat currency they fully control. The proponents of these theory admit the risk of inflation but see this as a very remote risk as long as sufficient real resources are available. But money still matters, perhaps in a somewhat different way than in the past, but it still matters. Inflation is always a monetary phenomenon, produced by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output (Milton Friedman).
What, in addition, the MMT proponents neglect is the international context. “Sovereign economic behavior” does not mean, in an interdependent world, that there can’t be very negative consequences for other countries. A more general resurgence of currency problems and disputes as a result of present budgetary and monetary policies seems a realistic probability.
A less extreme school of economists doesn’t see any problem in running and continue to rununusually high budget deficits and public debts, because they expect interest rates to remain very low for a long time. The supporters of this school refer to the trend decline in interest rates and the structurally lower (but unobservable) natural rate of interest. In their view sustainable government debt ratio’s can be much higher than in the past, because when nominal gdp growth rates exceed nominal interest rates the burden of existing government debt shrinks. I don’t exclude relatively low interest rates (and, therefore, less pressure from interest payments on budget deficits), but from a risk management perspective, setbacks should not be ruled out, because current extremely low interest rates are in any case partly caused by the weak world economy and the loose monetary policy of central banks.
Amongst professionals MMT is very controversial. Some mainstream economists (Kenneth Rogoff) have coined this theory as “modern monetary nonsens” or (Otmar Issing) “dangerously naive policy prescriptions” and a recipe for a surge in inflation. If we forget about extreme versions of MMT, the discussion boils down to an assessment of the size of the frictionless overcapacity in an economy. Unfortunately, the output gap as a benchmark for existing overcapacity, is a problematic concept. Financial and political crises can have long-lasting effects and lead to permanent output losses, the size of these losses depending on the nature and magnitude of the crisis. So, the business cycle is under those circumstances not a symmetrical movement around a trend and deviations from the trend are therefore difficult to calculate. In its April 2020 World Economic Outlook the IMF calculatesthe permanent “corona output loss”at 3% of gdp, lower than the long-term damage of the financial crisis of 2008. I think it is too early for reliable calculations, because the crisis is not over yet. My personal feeling is that the permanent output loss of the coronacrisis can easily be much higher and more in line with previous IMF studies (5 to 15% of gdp).
If it is true that our economies have to go through a fundamental transition process - a view that is broadly supported, also by MMT proponents - the traditional overcapacity figure is a very unreliable indicator for potential inflationary pressures. Existing overcapacity in “old” (polluting, energy consuming, etc.) industries should not be taken into account. The re-schooling of the labor force for a new economic era, the re-building of sectors hard hit by the coronacrisis, the emergence of completely new industries, less globalization, all these developments can result in frictions with potential inflationary consequences if monetary aggregates continue to grow fast. Crucial in such an environment is what will happen with the velocity of money. There is, ex ante, no reason to expect that this velocity will move in the opposite direction of the (very fast) money growth.
Interesting in this context is that even if traditional output gaps are used, the possibility of a surge in inflation is not to be excluded. Larry Summers (former Minister of Finance of the US), echoed by Olivier Blanchard (former chief economist of the IMF) made in the beginning of March, in a contribution for the Financial Times, the point that Biden’s $1.9 trillion program the outputgap already far exceeds, setting off inflationary pressures, with potential serious consequences for financial stability. Anyhow, caution must be exercised in assuming that inflationary risks are non-existent because of a huge output gap.
In addition, the current inflation figures do not include the price increase of assets (houses, stocks). How to deal with asset price developments has been a contentious issue amongst economists for years already, with views ranging from “leaning against the wind” to “let’s wait and see what happens” and solve anyproblems with ample liquidity provision and macro-prudential measures. Admitting that a housing or stock market bubble is dificult to identify, the problem remains that price developments of assets have a profound impact on the real economy. Monetary policy can feed house prices and the stock market, in particular if this policy, as it is now the case, is very expansionary. Price stability is part of the mandate of central banks, so is financial stability. I think more thought should be spent on whether and to what extent asset price developments could become part of the monetary authorities inflation target.
It is interesting to see how many in Western countries at this moment, implicitly or explicitly embrace the gist of MMT and, thereby, minimize the potential dangers of extremely high public deficits and debts. However, for years in a row, analysts, politicians, academics have expressed concerns about China’s high debt level, in spite of the fact that China had even more control over its currency than countries in other parts of the world. No one applied MMT on China. The Chinese authorities themselves rightly saw financial risks looming as a result of the high level of indebtedness and started some years ago their deleveraging policy, a policy that has come under pressure of international developments and the coronacrisis. But financial stability remains a focus area of the Chinese authorities. It should become more of a worry in other parts of the world too. If awareness does not grow that debt and deficits matter, public finances in many countries will end up at an unsustainable path, with potentially serious inflationary and financial stability consequences, nationally and internationally.
The danger right now is that central banks and governments have become the prisoners of their own promises and policies. Indeed, we need big and bold decisions, but we also urgently need international coordination, a sufficient awareness of the potential risks involved in present policies, exit strategies, and an understanding of each others policy goals and ambitions. We often have more in common in this regard than is thought. The world economy is on the verge of a recovery, but the challenges in front of us are enormous and require a multilateral approach more than ever.
Nout Wellink, 3 April 2021